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(2) the discharged indebtedness is not treated as a purchase
price reduction, (3) the taxpayer has no preconceived plan
or intention to dispose of the assets, (4) the selected assets
are depreciable having a weighted average remaining useful
life no longer than the weighted average remaining useful
life of all the taxpayer's depreciable properties excluding
fully depreciated assets, (5) the taxpayer has sufficient bases
to absorb the basis adjustment, (6) in no instance will basis
be reduced below salvage value and (7) the assets are not
depreciable using the retirement-replacement-betterment
method.  In addition, the taxpayer must agree to treat basis
reduction as ordinary income on later sale and to adjust
depreciation subsequently claimed accordingly.21
Planning principles
Basis reduction is deemed to have occurred at the
beginning of the taxable year following the taxable year in
which the discharge of indebtedness occurs.22  That means,
for most taxpayers, reduction of basis is carried out as of
January 1 of the year following the year of debt discharge.
This creates a "zone of manipulation"for debtors in terms of
making advantageous adjustments in property ownership.
The adjustments may involve —
¥  Disposal of property before the end of the taxable
year in which the indebtedness is cancelled if it would be
advantageous not to reduce the basis of those assets.
¥  Acquisition of additional property before the start of
the taxable year following the year of debt discharge in
order to absorb basis reduction and perhaps avoid
recognition of income from discharge of indebtedness
(which could happen with solvent debtors generally and
even with solvent farm debtors).23
¥  Delay in acquisition of property until after the start of
the following taxable year.
¥  Giving special attention to property acquired through
incurrence of the cancelled debt or securing the cancelled
debt because those items are first and second in line for
basis adjustment.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 39.03[6] (1993).
2 I.R.C. § 108 (a)(1)(A).
3 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).
4 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(C).
5 I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
6 I.R.C. § 1017[b][2].
7 I.R.C. § 108(b)(5).
8 I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2).
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1.
10 S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1.
12 Id.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1[a].
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1[b][7].
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1 [a][3].
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-2(a).
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-2.  See Rev. Proc. 85-44, 1985-2 C.B.
504 (conditions under which IRS will issue advance rulings
and closing letters permitting a variation from the general rule).
20 1985-2 C.B. 504.
21 See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 8544001, July 12, 1985.  For a citation to
other rulings approving special basis reduction, see 4 Harl,
supra n. 1, § 39.03[6], n. 142.
22 I.R.C. §§ 1017(a), 108(b)(5)(B).
23 See I.R.C. § 108(g)(3)(D).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 11
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[5].* The debtor operated a cattle
ranch. The Farm Credit Bank (creditor) had two claims, one
secured by land and the other an unsecured deficiency
judgment resulting from foreclosure of other mortgages.
The value of the debtor’s assets exceeded the value of the
total debts by 3 to 1. The debtor’s plan (1) placed the
creditor’s unsecured claim in a separate class and provided
for security of that claim from the debtor’s cattle, and (2)
provided for payment of the secured claim over 20 years at
the contract rate of interest. Although the debtor had
substantial losses in pre-petition years, the plan provided
that plan payments would be made from the sales of cattle,
including additional sales if necessary to meet monthly
payments. The creditor objected to the plan in that (1) it was
unfair to place the creditor’s unsecured claim in a separate
class, (2) the 20 year payment period was unfair, and (3) the
debtor’s pre-petition loss record demonstrated that the
debtor could not meet the plan payments without liquidation
of the herd. The court upheld the plan, noting that the pre-
petition losses were self-inflicted as the debtor attempted to
increase the quality of the herd. The court also held that
placement of the creditor’s unsecured claim in a separate
class was reasonable because of the security provided. The
court also held that the 20 year payment period was not
unfair in that the creditor had caused the bankruptcy filing
in the first place by failing to negotiate a payment schedule
with a debtor who had more than enough assets to secure the
payments. In re Shoeneberg, 156 B.R. 963 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8]*
TRUSTEE FEES. The debtors’ plan provided for
annual $1,500 payments for the trustee’s fee; however, a
standing trustee had been appointed in the district and the
trustee objected to the plan because the plan did not include
the statutory 10 percent fee. The debtors argued that the 10
percent fee was excessive in this case for the amount of
effort and expenses incurred by the trustee. The debtors also
argued that the court had the power to review the standing
trustee’s fee for reasonableness. The court held that it had
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no power to set or review the standing trustee’s fee. The
court questioned the need for a standing trustee in the
district and the need for a 10 percent fee which could
endanger many Chapter 12 plans. In addition, the court
noted that the fee could force many debtors into paying
claims directly to the creditors in order to avoid the fee. In
re Marriot, 156 B.R. 803 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993).
    CHAPTER 13   
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[5].* The debtor had granted the
secured creditor a mortgage on the debtor’s residence. The
mortgage also listed appliances, furniture and equipment in
the residence as security for the loan. The debtor’s plan
bifurcated the mortgage into secured and unsecured claims
and the creditor objected, arguing that Section 1322(b)(2)
prohibited modification of mortgages against the debtor’s
residence. The court agreed but held that because the
mortgage was also secured by the furniture, appliances and
equipment in the house, the creditor’s claim was not eligible
for the Section 1322(b)(2) protection. The mortgage was a
federally guaranteed loan and the creditor argued that the
loan was completely secured. The court held that the
mortgage could be considered secured only to the extent of
the fair market value of the collateral. In re Hamond, 156
B.R. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7]*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS filed a pre-petition levy
against the debtors’ bank account funds. The debtors filed
for Chapter 13 and sought sanctions against the IRS for
failure to release the liens and for post-petition collection of
the levied funds. The court held that the levy divested the
debtors of their interest in the funds; therefore, the post-
petition collection did not affect estate property and did not
violate the automatic stay. The IRS also failed to reduce its
claim by the collected funds and the court held that the
funds could be ordered to be turned over to the estate.
However, because a turnover of the funds would increase
the interest penalty assessed against the debtors, the
turnover would not be ordered. In re Abercrombie, 156
B.R. 782 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtors filed for Chapter 13 with a
plan which provided for payment of all priority taxes but did
not provide for any payments on secured tax claims. The
IRS filed one claim for priority taxes and one secured claim
for taxes.  The debtors did not object to the IRS claims and
the IRS did not object to the plan. The court held that the
IRS claims in excess of the plan tax payments were
discharged but that the lien securing the remaining taxes
survived the bankruptcy case. The court rejected a petition
by the debtors to value the IRS secured claim, holding that
the time for such valuation was during the bankruptcy case
before the confirmation of the plan. In re Kuebler, 156
B.R. 1012 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
In 1981, the debtor had filed a W-4 form listing 40
exemptions.  In 1987, the debtor filed returns for 1982
through 1985 claiming three exemptions.  The debtor filed
bankruptcy more than three years after the returns were filed
and claimed the taxes owed as dischargeable.  The IRS
argued that the taxes were not dischargeable because the
false W-4 form, the late filed returns and the filing of
bankruptcy just after the taxes became dischargeable were
an attempt to evade taxes.  The Bankruptcy Court had
excluded evidence that the debtor had willfully failed to pay
the taxes and held that the remaining evidence did not prove
a willful attempt to evade taxes and that the taxes were
dischargeable.  The District Court reversed, holding that the
evidence of willful failure to pay the taxes was relevant. On
remand, the Bankruptcy Court held that under the stipulated
facts, the IRS failed to show that the debtor had willfully
attempted to evade taxes. In re Peterson, 93-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,499 (D. Wyo. 1993), on rem. from, 93-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,101 (D. Wyo. 1993), rev’g, 132
B.R. 68 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991).
LITIGATION COSTS. The court held that because a
Bankruptcy Court is not a “court of the United States,” a
Bankruptcy Court has no authority to make an award of
litigation costs under I.R.C. § 7430.  The District Court held
that a Bankruptcy Court has two choices, either to refer the
matter to the District Court or to make proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law which are then submitted to the
District Court for review. In re Yochum, 156 B.R. 816 (D.
Nev. 1993).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The debtor was a general
partner in a partnership. The debtor signed an agreement
with the other general partner making the other partner
solely responsible for payroll and withholding taxes. The
court held that because Utah partnership law provides that
all general partners are jointly and severally liable for
partnership debts, the debtor was liable for the responsible
person 100 percent penalty of I.R.C. § 6672 for withholding
taxes not paid by the partnership. The court also held that it
had no jurisdiction to order that the IRS seek recovery from
the managing partner before seeking payment from the
debtor’s estate. In re Norton v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,516 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
SETOFF.  In 1989, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and
claimed federal income tax refunds for 1988 and 1989 as
exempt. The debtor received a discharge and in 1990 filed
1988 and 1989 income tax returns, claiming the refunds.
The IRS withheld the 1988 refund as a setoff against the
federal tax claim in the bankruptcy case. The debtor
petitioned for payment of the withheld refund, arguing that
the IRS was not entitled to a setoff because (1) the debt was
discharged in the bankruptcy case and (2) the refund was
exempt property. The court held that the refund and tax
claims were pre-petition mutual debts eligible for setoff and
that the discharge of the claim and exemption of the refund
did not affect the IRS right to set off the mutual debts.
Posey v. I.R.S., 156 B.R. 910 (W.D. N.Y. 1993).
CONTRACTS
FRAUD. The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to
purchase a one-half embryo interest in the defendant’s
Angus donor cow. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
fraudulently induced the plaintiff to purchase the interest in
the cow by (1) making false predictions as to the production
of the donor cow and the show and breeding status of the
cow, and (2) making false statements as to the formation of
a partnership. the court held that because no fiduciary
relationship existed between the parties, no
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misrepresentations could be made where the conditions of
the cow were open to both parties. The Court also held that
misrepresentations as to the legal status of the parties as a
partnership were not actionable fraud.  Mabry v. Pelton,
432 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The plaintiff was a
wheat farmer who alleged that on May 28, 1986, the
defendant orally agreed to purchase 85,000 bushels of wheat
at $3.75/bu. The plaintiff filed the action on May 21, 1991
and the defendant argued that the action was time barred by
the four-year statute of limitation on contracts for the sales
of goods under Mont. Code § 30-2-725(1). The plaintiff
argued that Mont. Code § 27-2-202(2) allowed five years
for bringing actions based on oral contracts. The court held
that the four-year limitation applied because the statute was
more specific in that it applied only to contracts involving
sales of goods. Mogan v. Cargill, Inc., 856 P.2d 973
(Mont. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BEANS. The FGIS has issued proposed regulations
eliminating the factor “clean-cut weevil-bored beans” from
the grade requirement for the class Blackeye beans and
changing the grade limits for the factors “total defects,”
“blistered, wrinkled and/or broken beans,” and “splits” for
the class Baby Lima beans. 58 Fed. Reg. 49248 (Sept. 22,
1993).
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].*  The
plaintiff had obtained several emergency farm loans from
the FmHA which were discharged in the plaintiff’s
bankruptcy case. After the case was closed the FmHA
foreclosed on the liens securing the discharged loans. The
plaintiff sought invalidation of the foreclosure and sale,
arguing that the FmHA failed to provide restructuring and
other pre-foreclosure rights as required by the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987. The court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to the 1987 Act rights because the plaintiff was no
longer a “borrower” once the plaintiff’s personal liability for
the debts was discharged in bankruptcy. Cummings v.
FmHA, 825 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND-ALM § 13.07[1].* The ASCS has adopted as final
amendments to the definition of agricultural land for
purposes of the reporting requirements for foreign
ownership of agricultural land in the U.S. In particular, the
regulation defines land used for forestry production as “land
exceeding 10 acres in which 10 percent is stocked by trees
of any size, including land that formerly had such tree cover
and that will be naturally or artificially regenerated.” Query,
whose crystal ball is to be used for the regeneration
prediction? Does the regulation mean “at least” or “more
than” 10 percent tree cover? 58 Fed. Reg. 48273 (Sept. 15,
1993).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The debtor had purchased broccoli
and cauliflower from a producer under purchase contracts
which provided for payment within 45-60 days. The
producer filed timely notice of intent to preserve its rights in
the PACA trust and petitioned the court to determine the
amount of the producer’s rights in the PACA trust.  7 C.F.R.
§ 46.46(f)(2) provides that producers are not entitled to
PACA trust protection for contracts with a payment period
over 30 days.  The producer argued that the requirement in
the regulation was invalid because the statute, 7 U.S.C. §
499e(c)(3), provided no maximum requirement for purchase
contracts. The court upheld the validity of the regulation
after examining the legislative history of the statute wherein
the Congress indicated that it was leaving to the Secretary
the responsibility of determining the maximum payment
period for producer contracts eligible for PACA trust
protection. In re Altabon Foods, Inc., 998 F.2d 718 (9th
Cir. 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.*  The plaintiff purchased
and used an aerosol can of insecticide manufactured by the
defendant. A chemical in the insecticide triggered an
asthmatic reaction in the plaintiff and the plaintiff sued the
defendant for failure to warn of a possible asthmatic
reaction. It was undisputed that the label on the can
complied with FIFRA labeling requirements. The court held
that the state failure to warn action was pre-empted by
FIFRA. Kolich v. Sysco Corp., 825 F. Supp. 959 (D. Kan.
1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS.  The decedent’s estate contained
several certificates of deposit (CD’s). One set of CD’s was
owned completely by the decedent. One set was owned as a
joint tenant with the surviving spouse and three daughters.
One set of CD’s was owned by the decedent but provided
for payment to the surviving spouse on the decedent’s death.
A final set of CD’s was owned by the decedent and
surviving spouse as joint tenants with a remainder payable
to the daughters. The surviving spouse filed a timely written
disclaimer of all interests in the CD’s, including the
survivorship interests and the interests created by the
decedent’s will. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was
effective because the surviving spouse’s interests in the
CD’s was not created until the death of the decedent and the
interests would pass either under the decedent’s will or by
the terms of the CD contract. Ltr. Rul. 9336011, June 8,
1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* Testamentary irrevocable trusts with
grandchildren as remainder beneficiaries were created on
the trustors’ deaths in 1947 and 1950. No additions were
made to the trusts after September 25, 1985. Each trust
corpus consisted of publicly trade stock and stock in a
closely-held corporation in which one grandchild was
active. The trustee sought a state court order amending the
trusts to allow non-pro rata distribution of trust assets upon
termination of the trusts. The IRS ruled that the amendment
would not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9335005,
May 25, 1993.
In June and July 1986, the decedents, husband and wife,
transferred assets to trusts for their grandchildren. The
grantors filed gift tax returns and elected to treat the trusts as
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direct skips. The first spouse died in 1990 and bequeathed
the residue of the estate to a marital trust. The marital trust
was split into two trusts, a GSTT exempt trust funded with
assets whose value equaled the decedent’s unused GSTT
exemption and for which a reverse QTIP election was made,
and a second trust for the remaining assets. At the death of
the surviving spouse, the GSTT exempt trust assets were
distributed to the grandchildrens’ trusts. The IRS ruled that
the June and July 1986 contributions to the grandchildren’s
trust were not subject to GSTT because the trusts’ property
would be included in the grandchildrens’ estates.  The IRS
also ruled that the transfer of the GSTT exempt trust assets
to the grandchildren’s trusts would not be subject to the
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9335027, June 4, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed a portion of the residuary estate
to a trust for the surviving spouse, with all net income
distributed to the spouse at least quarterly. The will allowed
the executor to make a partial QTIP election for the trust
with the trust divided into QTIP and non-QTIP trusts. The
executor made a partial QTIP election based on a fraction
whose numerator was the value at the date of the election of
all assets in the marital trust, reduced by the value of
specific assets, and whose denominator was the value of all
assets in the marital trust. The IRS ruled that the trust was
eligible QTIP and that the partial election was allowed. The
IRS also ruled that the QTIP trust could be funded with a
non-pro rata share of each asset so long as the assets chosen
have a fair market value equal to the fractional portion. Ltr.
Rul. 9335025, June 4, 1993.
REFUNDS. The decedent died in 1972 and in 1974, the
estate filed its estate tax return. In 1983 in an agreed
decision, the estate was held to owe $13,853 in estate taxes.
The taxes were not paid and in 1985 the IRS levied against
the estate’s two bank accounts, one of which was sufficient
to pay the estate taxes and interest, the other was in excess
of the amount owed. In 1991, the estate delinquently filed
its 1980-1985 fiduciary income tax returns with payment of
the amounts owed and sought recovery of the amount levied
in 1985 in excess of the taxes owed at that time. The court
held that the claim for a refund was barred by the two year
limitation of I.R.C. § 6511 because the 1985 levy was
considered a payment of the fiduciary income taxes owed
for 1980-1985.  Est. of Reisgen v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,515 (E.D. La. 1993).
VALUATION.  The decedent had received a life estate
in the predeceased spouse’s community property share of
the couple’s ranch. The decedent’s estate appraiser valued
the life estate share of the property at one-half of the the fair
market value of the full property less a 30 percent discount
for the partial interest. The IRS ruled that the value of the
partial undivided interest in the ranch was the fair market
value less the cost of a partitioning of the interest from the
whole interest. The IRS cited Est. of Fittl v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1986-542 for the proposition that the best interest of
an owner of an undivided interest would be in partitioning
the property; therefore, the only discount would be the costs
of partitioning.  Ltr. Rul. 9336002, May 28, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
APPEALS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
amending the Statement of Procedural Rules pertaining to
how a taxpayer may administratively appeal adjustments of
a taxpayer’s federal tax liability.  58 Fed. Reg. 48802 (Sept.
20, 1993).
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7].* The taxpayer was
allowed a bad debt deduction for a loan to the taxpayer’s
wholly-owned corporation where the taxpayer had intended
that the loan be repaid and the taxpayer received no income
from the corporation during the period of the loan. The
worthless loan was deductible as a business bad debt
because the court found that the loan was made for the
purpose of protecting the taxpayer’s salary. Baldwin v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-433.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
claimed deductions for expenses relating to a goat raising
activity. The court held that the deductions were not allowed
because the goat raising business was not entered into with
the intent to make a profit since the activity was not
conducted in a business-like manner. Keller v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-415.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION. The taxpayer
owned a single family residence which was rented to others.
The residence was destroyed by a tornado. The nature of the
surrounding property had changed to high value residential
developments and the taxpayer could not afford to
reconstruct a dwelling in keeping with the change; therefore,
the taxpayer sold the land and purchased replacement land
on which a replacement dwelling would be constructed. The
IRS ruled (1) that the nature and use of the land was
sufficiently tied to the house to constitute an economic unit,
and (2) that the taxpayer could defer, under I.R.C. § 1033,
the gain from the insurance proceeds from the loss of the
house and the proceeds from the sale of the land to the
extent the proceeds did not exceed the cost of the
replacement land and dwelling. Ltr. Rul. 9334007, May 26,
1993.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
formed a partnership under the Delaware limited liability
company statute. The partnership agreement and state LLC
law provided that the bankruptcy or liquidation of a partner
would cause the dissolution of the partnership. The LLC
agreement allowed for continuation of the partnership after
a terminating event if a majority of the remaining members
voted to continue the partnership. The IRS ruled that the
partnership lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life. The LLC agreement provided that the management
of the LLC was vested in all of the partners. The IRS ruled
that the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
centralized management; therefore, the LLC would be taxed
as a partnership for federal tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9335032,
June 4, 1993.
The taxpayers formed a partnership under the state
limited liability company statute. The partnership agreement
and state LLC law provided that the bankruptcy or
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liquidation of a partner would cause the dissolution of the
partnership. The IRS ruled that the partnership lacked the
corporate characteristic of continuity of life. The partnership
agreement and state LLC law provided that a partner could
not transfer an interest in the partnership without the consent
of the other partners. The IRS ruled that the partnership
lacked the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests; therefore, the partnership would be taxed as a
partnership for federal tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9335062,
June 11, 1993.
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer received a lump sum
distribution from a qualified pension plan when the plan was
terminated. The taxpayer was age 54 and still employed by
the plan sponsor at the time of the distribution. The court
held that the distribution was not eligible for 10-year
averaging because the reason for the distribution was not
one of the four qualifying events in I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A).
Clark v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 15 (1993).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
October 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.69 3.66 3.64 3.63
110% AFR 4.07 4.03 4.01 4.00
120% AFR 4.44 4.39 4.37 4.35
Mid-term
AFR 5.00 4.94 4.91 4.89
110% AFR 5.50 5.43 5.39 5.37
120% AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86
Long-term
AFR 5.84 5.76 5.72 5.69
110% AFR 6.44 6.34 6.29 6.26
120% AFR 7.03 6.91 6.85 6.81
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c]*
ELECTION. Because of an error by the taxpayer
corporation’s attorney, the taxpayer failed to file Form
2553, Subchapter S Election, but filed Form 1120S as an S
corporation for three years. The taxpayer argued that the
IRS was “equitably estopped” from denying the taxpayer S
corporation status because the IRS “accepted” the tax
returns. The court held that, under Office of Personel
Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), estoppel
may not be asserted against the federal government for
recovery of “public funds.” In addition, the taxpayer did not
reasonably rely on the IRS “acceptance” of the tax returns
which are subject to audit and administrative adjustments.
Smith S, Inc. v. Comm’r, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,514 (E.D. N.C. 1993).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers sold a
residence and purchased property which contained a
residence and a business. The taxpayers paid more for the
entire property than its fair market value and allocated the
excess entirely to the residential portion of the property in
order to decrease the amount of gain from the sale of the
previous residence. The court held that none of the excess
purchase price over fair market value could be allocated to
the residential portion of the property because the taxpayers
failed to provide any evidence to support the allocation.
Richards v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-422.
LABOR
AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 3.02.* The
defendant was a large commercial producer and processor
of chicken eggs. The employees at one of the defendant’s
plants voted to have the United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union represent them in collective
bargaining. The defendant argued that the employees were
agricultural laborers and that the plant was exempt from the
requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. The
NLRB had ruled in another case that a commercial plant did
not have agricultural laborers if the plant regularly handled
any amount of products from outside producers. The burden
of proof was on the defendant to show that outside eggs
were not being regularly processed at the plant. The court
upheld the NLRB’s determination that the defendant’s
employees were not agricultural laborers because of
sufficient evidence that the plant regularly processed eggs
from outside producers.   N.L.R.B. v. Cal-Maine Farms,
Inc., 998 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1993).
BOYCOTT . The plaintiffs were supporters of the
United Farm Workers’ boycott of California grapes. The
plaintiffs had attempted to distribute leaflets and petitions in
support of the boycott at the defendant’s grocery store but
were arrested at the instigation of the defendant. The
plaintiffs sued the defendant for denial of free speech rights
and were awarded $750 damages each. The court held that
the Texas Constitution provides no private right of action
for damages to enforce an individual’s right of free speech.
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Ortiz, 856 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993).
SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were migrant seasonal agricultural
laborers who worked for the defendants on their vegetable
farm. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (the Act) and the
defendants argued that they were exempt from the Act
because of the family farm exception. The plaintiffs argued
that the family farm exception was not available because the
defendants transported the workers on various implements
and vehicles on the farm. The court held that the
transportation of workers that occurs in the normal course of
operations on the farm was insufficient to make the
defendants subject to the Act. However, the court remanded
the case for trial on the issue of whether third parties
recruited workers for the defendants. The court noted that
word-of-mouth references by the workers to other workers
was not recruiting under the Act.  The plaintiff alleged that
the defendants failed to file and pay federal employment
taxes for the workers. The court held that the plaintiffs only
had standing to seek the reporting of the taxes because the
payment of the taxes did not change their eligibility for the
social security benefits. The plaintiffs also alleged that the
defendant violated the minimum wage law by temporarily
withholding amounts from the paychecks until the last day
of work (used as an incentive to keep the workers until the
end of the harvest). The court agreed that this was a
violation but remanded the case for a determination of the
amount of damages, noting that the withheld amounts were
eventually repaid and that such repaid amounts should be
credited against the damages. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999
F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1993).
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NUISANCE
LIVESTOCK PENS-ALM § 13.08.* The plaintiffs
purchased their property in 1949. The defendant purchased
property on the other side of a road from the plaintiffs’
residence in 1981. Directly across from the plaintiffs’
residence, the previous owner had a livestock holding pen
which was used for feeding and working cattle which
otherwise roamed on nearby pastures. The defendant
improved the pens and started a confined feedlot operation
and the plaintiffs filed suit for an injunction of the operation
as a nuisance and damages for invasion of privacy. Under
Kan. Stat. § 2-3202, agricultural activities are presumed not
to be a nuisance if conducted in a manner consistent with
good agricultural practice and established prior to
surrounding nonagricultural activities. The plaintiffs’
residence was part of a farm operation conducted by the
plaintiffs. The court held that because the defendant’s use
was not prior to the plaintiffs’ use and the plaintiffs’ use was
agricultural, the “right-to-farm” statute did not apply.  The
court also held that under the traditional concepts of
nuisance for farmland, the defendant was not entitled to a
summary judgment. The court held that the defendant was
entitled to summary judgment on the action for invasion of
privacy because the odors from the feedlot were not a
physical intrusion on the plaintiffs’ property. Finlay v.
Finlay, 856 P.2d 183 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
HOG FARM-ALM § 13.08.* The plaintiffs purchased
and moved into their rural residence in February 1985. The
defendants moved into a farm across the road from the
plaintiffs residence in May 1987 and began a hog operation.
The area surrounding the parties farms was rural with some
residential development. The state Department of
Agriculture inspected the defendants’ farm and required a
livestock waste management program in order for the farm
to be considered in compliance with the statutory right-to-
farm requirements. The waste management program was
implemented. The court held that the defendants’ farm was
not subject to a private nuisance suit because (1) it was
operated in conformity with generally accepted agricultural
practices, and (2) the use of the area within a one mile
radius of the defendants’ property had not changed before
the defendants started their hog operation. Steffens v.
Keeler, 503 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
PARTNERSHIP
DEFINITION-ALM § 7.03[1].* The plaintiff contracted
with the defendant to purchase a one-half embryo interest in
the defendant Angus donor cow. The plaintiff argued that
the parties had formed a partnership but the court disagreed,
pointing to the purchase contract which explicitly denied
that the contract formed a partnership. The court also noted
that no terms of the partnership agreement were established.
Mabry v. Pelton, 432 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TRACTOR. The plaintiff’s tractor was destroyed by a
fire caused by either a faulty fuse panel or accumulation of
debris on a heat shield. The plaintiff filed a claim for the
loss from the insurance company which paid the claim. The
plaintiff filed a strict liability and negligence suit against the
tractor manufacturer. The defendant argued that the
insurance company was the real party in interest and was
not eligible to bring a strict liability action. The court held
that the insurance company was the real party in interest
under an assignment clause in the insurance policy and that
Ga. Code § 51-1-11(b)(1) allowed strict liability actions
only for individuals. The court also held that the
manufacturer was not liable for negligence because the
evidence failed to show the cause of the fire resulted from a
defect of design or manufacture. USF & G Co. v. J.I. Case
Co., 432 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The defendants were the
owners and employees of a orchard and were observed by
inspectors from the Department of Environmental
Protection and Energy (DEPE) improperly applying
pesticides to their trees. The DEPE offered the defendants
reduced fines in settlement of the offenses but the
defendants refused the offers. The DEPE brought an action
in Superior Court to impose penalties under the Pesticide
Act, N.J. Stat. §§ 13:1D-9(e), 13:1F-10, 2A:58-1. The
Superior Court remanded the case back to the DEPE for an
administrative hearing on the defendants’ liability. The
appellate court held that the statute provides for primary
jurisdiction in the Superior Court for actions brought by the
DEPE. The court also held that the action was not subject to
the two year statute of limitations for criminal proceedings
because the penalties involved did not involve a forfeiture.
State v. Larchmont Farms, 628 A.2d 761 (N.J. Super.
1993).
STATE BOARDS. The Kansas State Board of
Agriculture (the Board) was elected by delegates of state
private agricultural associations at the Board's annual
meeting. The court found that the Board was a state agency
with general governmental powers because the Board’s
functions included such duties as the appointment of the
state Dairy Commissioner which affected all residents of
Kansas. The court held that the method of electing the
Board violated the “one person, one vote” principle of the
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and
permanently enjoined the election of another board until the
legislature enacted a constitutional method of election.
Hellebust v. Brownback, 824 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Kan.
1993); 824 F.  Supp. 1524 (D. Kan. 1993).
WILD ANIMALS. As part of a legislative directive, the
state Department of Fish and Game (the department) began
relocating wild tule deer to their original native ranges,
which included areas near the plaintiff’s property. The
plaintiff sued the state for damages from the elk to the
plaintiff’s property and crops, arguing that the relocation
was a governmental taking without compensation. Although
the state did the relocating, monitored the elk, licensed the
hunting of the elk and made attempts to keep the elk off
private property, the court held that the state did not
sufficiently control the elk to be liable for damages caused
by the elk. The court held that the state’s involvement in the
relocation and monitoring did not change the nature of the
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elk as wild animals and established law placed no duty on
the state for damages done by wild animals. Moerman v.
State, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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TRESPASS
TIMBER. The defendant purchased timber land
adjacent to the plaintiff’s property. The defendant’s father
had incorrectly marked the boundary between the
properties; therefore, when the defendant’s contractor
removed trees, the contractor removed trees on the
plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff sued for double damages,
under Me. Rev. Stat. § 7552-A, because the defendant
failed to mark the true boundary. The plaintiff also sought
treble damages, under Me. Rev. Stat. § 7552, for willful and
knowing cutting of the plaintiff’s timber. The court held
that the defendant’s good faith attempt to mark the
boundary and reliance on the father’s markings was
insufficient to bar application of Me. Rev. Stat. § 7552-A.
The court also ruled that treble damages were not justified
because the defendant made a good faith effort to mark the
boundary and that knowledge of facts that indicated
problems with the markings was insufficient to prove
willfulness which required evidence of complete disregard
for the plaintiff’s rights. Fraser v. Barton, 628 A.2d 146
(Me. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Rubenstein v. U.S., 826 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(gross estate), see p. 137 supra.
Nalle v. Comm'r, 997 F.2d 1134(5th Cir. 1993), rev’g,
99 T.C. 187 (1992) (investment tax credit) see p. 146
supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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